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Abst rac t - -Recent  research suggests that new product specifications evolve during its realization. 
In this paper, we introduce a nonstationary Markovian model that supports the dynamic achieve- 
ment of the new product definition without precedence constraints, taking into account both market 
and technological uncertainty. We use lattice programming techniques to prove the existence of a 
nondecreasing monotonic optimal policy. Thus, we enable a more efficient computation of optimal 
policies of the Markov decision process. We also prove that the monotonic optimal paths are robust 
to tile variation of key-parameters a  the solving rate of the design activities and the safety margin 
for achieving the new product at the deadline. @ 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
Keywords - -Nonstat ionary  Markov decision process, Monotonic optimal policy, Robust optimal 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent research (for a review, see [1]) suggests that  in many firms projects start  with lax specifi- 
cations of the new product  requirements.  P roduct  specif ications may evolve dur ing the project,  
and under uncertainty, the early definit ion can be shown to be opt imal  only in a l imited set of 
s i tuat ions [2]. To model  the t ime-qual i ty  trade-offs taking place dur ing the evolut ion of an NPD 
s i tuat ion wi thout  precedence constraints,  we use a discrete-t ime, f inite-horizon Markov decision 
process. Such a sequential  decision process framework allows for the expl ic it  incorporat ion of 
the decisions as well as the effects of underlying uncerta inty present in the process. Its principal 
drawback is the tendency for the underly ing state space of the formulat ion to grow explosively 
with respect to the size of the system. When the goal is to obtain numerical  solutions, structural  
propert ies can lead to great gains in computat iona l  efficiency. Thus, for enabl ing the efficient 
computat ion  of opt imal  policies in Markov models of sequential  decision processes, one is of- 
ten interested in showing that  the value funct ion is monotonic,  convex, and/or  supermodular  
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in the state variables. They easily reduce the class of policies to be searched and make easier 
the implementation i  real life situations. Monotone optimal policies constitute one of the most 
well-known and useful of such characterizations; see, for example, [3, Chapter 8; 4, Section 4.7.3], 
since they allow the backward induction algorithm to look for candidate actions for the arg max 
for a given state x only in the superior cones of the elements of the arg max of all states x' which 
are smaller than x, instead of looking for them in the whole available action space. 
In this paper, we establish the existence of nondecreasing monotonic optimal policies for a 
nonstationary Markov decision process, which models the time-quality trade-offs taking place 
during the evolution of an NPD situation without precedence constraints. The new product is 
characterized by a finite arbitrary number of customer needs, and the market payoff function 
considered includes the different ypes of S-curve models, as well as analytical cumulative mar- 
ket payoff functions for the case of several customer needs [5,6] encountered in literature. The 
existence of the monotonic nondecreasing optimal policies confirms an intuitive "greedy" feature 
of the optimal control policy. "The performance r quirement of a controller increases with the 
number of performance l vels already achieved by the engineers". Assuming that the team of 
engineers will always perform the tasks allocated to it in a certain priority order the transition 
probabilities were calculated via numerical inversion of a queueing system Laplace transform. 
Finally, we prove that the monotonic optimal paths are robust o the variation of key-parameters 
as the solving rate of the design activities and the safety margin for achieving the new product 
at the deadline. 
In the research and development li erature, the search for monotonicity properties is not new, 
especially in patent racing literature. Recently, [7] formulated a simple one-dimensional continu- 
ous time limit version of the sequential information acquisition problem with purely explicit cost 
experimentation. Their observation process has a prototyping interpretation, and can be viewed 
as a running sample mean of observations. Our approach for obtaining monotonicity is based on 
the research of [8]. Formulating the problem in a dynamic programming setting, we show that the 
optimal policy follows a monotone optimal control by establishing the supermodularity of the ob- 
jective function. The general monotonicity heory of optimal solutions using lattice programming 
techniques from [8] encompass many applications in many production planning models. In [9,10] 
were obtained monotonicity results for stochastic dynamic programming models of discrete-time 
production planning with stochastic demand. 
2. MARKOV-DECIS ION PROCESS- -SPECIF IC  ELEMENTS 
In this paper, we focus on a NPD process without precedence constraints, consisting of N 
concurrent design tasks. The process progress is reviewed at equidistant points in time until tile 
deadline, T. At the beginning of each review period t, (t, t + 1], the aggregate controller decides 
first whether to continue or not the NPD. The abandonment is the result of a low product 
perlbrmance, which does not enable the achievement of' a fully functional product before the 
deadline. In case of continuation, the controller modifies the design tasks performance l vels in 
an interactive process aiming at a maximal market payoff at the deadline. Thus, the targets 
on design tasks realization for the detailed planning level are provided, under the constraint of 
achieving the currently desired performance l vels, at the deadline, with a certain probability. 
These targets also play another ole. Organizational psychology (for a review, see [11]) shows 
that there is a dependency between the productivity and the work pressure, and for this reason 
the team of engineers will receive a minimal requirement of work during one review period. 
We assume that the team of engineers will always perform the tasks allocated to it according 
to a priority order. For each design task, we have different levels of performance, giving the 
quality of its execution. Each performance l vel consists of a list of planned activities (to be 
sequentially performed [12]) with solving times random variables i.i.d. Exp (#) distributed (see 
for empirical evidence [13,14]). To attain a performance l vel, we assume that the engineer has 
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to sequentially execute the design task at all previous performance l vels, which implies different 
stochastic durations for the solving time, depending on the level initially specified. For each 
design task a minimal performance l vel has to be achieved, in order to }lave a fully functional 
new product. New activities arrive at each of the design tasks in progress during the review 
period t according to a Poisson process of rate A(t). They appear as a result of the incapacity 
of solving the design task with its current description, so we model them to have pre-emptive 
resume priority over the planned activities. In later stages, the rate A(t) decreases. 
NOTATION. 
The variables of our NPD 
T 
M 
N 
l(.,t) {1 . . . .  , N} ----~ N 
A(n) 
project model are as follows. 
the total number of review periods (review periods are numbered 
from 1 to T); 
the total number of engineers; 
the total number of concurrent design tasks during the whole pro- 
ject; 
the required safety margin required for the probability of exceeding 
the maximal team solving capacity; f~ E (0, 1] 
the review-period ependent Poisson arrival of unplanned activities 
for all the design tasks allocated to the engineers (A(t)/# < M); 
the function giving the achieved performance l vel of a design task 
n at the beginning of review period t; 
the number of activities planned for solving an arbitrary perfor- 
mance level l of a design task n, assuming the previous levels already 
solved (all activities are assumed to have the solving time exponen- 
tially distributed with the same mean time #); Vn = 1, . . . ,  N; 
/rain(') : {1,. . .  N} --* N the function giving the minimal performance level at which each 
design task must be performed in order to obtain a functional prod- 
uct; 
Sn the solving time of a level of the design task n; for n = 1, . . . ,  N, they 
are independent random variables Erlang-A(n), with mean A(n)/l~. 
Assuming that the team of engineers will always perform the tasks allocated to it in a certain 
priority order, a nonstationary Markov decision process can model the time-quality trade-offs 
that take place during the evolution of an NPD project as described above. 
THE DECISION TIME POINTS. The decision points are equidistant and the horizon of the problem 
is finite. The decision point t corresponds to the beginning of review t + 1, say, t E {0, 1,. . .  T -  1}. 
THE STATE SPACE AND THE ACTION SPACE. The state set X(t) at moment and the action set 
At(xt) in the state xt are 
X(O) = {xo = 0 E z+N}, and for t E {1 , . . .T -  1}: 
x(t) = {xt 
for t E {0 , . . .Y -  1}, 
( 
At (xt) -- ~at [ 
xt = (l (1 , t ) , . . . ,1  (n , t ) , . . . , l  (N,t))  E Z N and 
Pr ~ S,~ <_M(T- t )  >_/3 
n= .,N l=/(n,t)+l 
(1) 
at = (at(1) , . . . ,  a t (n ) , . . . ,  at(N)) E Z+ N ] 
a . . . .  t(n) > at(n) >_ 0, Vn = 1 . . . . .  N / " (2) 
( N l(n,t)+a ...... ,(n) 
[n=l  t=t(,m)+l 
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The action at in the state xt decides how many other levels above xt we want to perform. 
The level up to which the design task n may be performed after the action a t was taken is 
l(n, t) + at(n). 
The probability constraint from (1) reflects the requirement of arriving from xt into the re- 
warded region, R = {1 E Z~ I I(n) >/rain(n), Vn = 1,. . .  ,N},  in the remaining (T - t) decision 
steps. 
The probability constraint from (2) requires that the probability that the total workload will 
exceed the maximal solving capacity of the team should not be greater than a required ~ margin. 
The maximal admissible total workload is computed by adding up the solving times of the total 
number of concurrent design tasks during the whole project. 
This Markov decision process has a partially ordered state space and action space which can be 
viewed as particular types of subsets of the lattice Z N. Moreover, the action space is a lattice. 
The partial order considered on Z+ N is x, y E Z+ N, and x < y imply • _< y~, Vn = 1, . . . ,  N. 
THE IMMEDIATE REWARDS. Vxt C X(t) and a E At(xt), the immediate reward is: 
rt(xt,a, xt+l)=O,  Vt =0, . . . ,T -  1, 
and the final reward is 
S 0, if 3 1 < no _< N, l (no, T) </rain(n0), 
rr(Xr) I f (xT), otherwise, 
where f (xT)  is a nondecreasing function with respect to the partial order on 7/, N (i.e., we say 
thatx_<:~,x ,~EZ N, i fx (n )  <~(n) ,V l<n<N) .  
This type of reward function is very general, describing the market value of a new product 
which has to fulfill several customer needs. There are different levels of customer's atisfaction 
for the achieved new product, function of the distance between the cumulated and the ideal value 
tbr each of the customer's needs. An S-curve type of market payoff function gives an expected 
market value for each cumulated value of a customer need achieved at the deadline. 
The rewarded region R def {1 E Z+Nll(n) _> /rain(n), Vn = 1,. . .  ,N} of our Markov decision 
process is bounded since the action space is also bounded due to the finite team solving capacity 
(i.e., only a finite number of design activities can be solved during one review period). 
The transition probabilities The transitions depend only on the decision time point, the ob- 
served state and the chosen action and not on the history of the process. The probability that 
the next state is xt+l, given that the state at the beginning of stage t is xt and that the action 
at E At(xt) is chosen, is the nonstationary probability: pt(xt, at, xt+t). 
PROPOSITION 1. / f  the the team of engineers will always perform the sequenced esign allocated 
to it in the priority order given by the scheduler, then for a fixed p and A(t), the transition 
probabilities of the Markov decision process constructed above are 
{ P t ( x , + ~  - x,), x~+~ E [x .x t  + at], Pt (xt, at, Xt+l) : 0, otherwise.  
PROOF. Due to the large variety of variables implied and due to the lack of detailed good quality 
empirical data to support theories, we assume that the team of engineers will always work all the 
time an the sequenced esign tasks in the order established by the scheduler. 
Let Y be the random variable giving the solving time of the allocated design tasks. The 
cummulative distribution function of Y equals Fw(t + 1 - t) = Pr{Y < 1} = Pr{C, na• _< 1}, 
where Cmax(k) is the makespan of a queueing system of M parallel servers with a common queue 
N X-M(n,t+l) A(n) of initially planned activities, and 0 unplanned having a series of k = ~n=l  z-,i=l(n,t)+l 
activities, where the processing is disturbed by a A(t)-Poisson arrival of unplanned activities 
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(A( t ) /# < M) .  Now, we have to prove that  the Laplace-transform of the distr ibution function of 
Cmax(k) can be obtained, and inverted to complete our proof. Let BP be the busy period in a 
M/M/1  queue with arrival rate A and service rate M#.  Then we have, for k > M, C ..... (M+k)  = 
BP  + C ..... (M  + k -1 )  and for k<M,  
A 
Cmax(k + 1), with probabi l i ty O(k ) '  
C, nax(k) = z (e (k ) )  + k ,  
Cmax(k -- 1), with probabi l i ty O(k) '  
Cmax(0) = 0 where O(k) = A + k# and Z is an exponential random variable. Let E be the 
Laplace transform, and denote, for s >_ 0, 
h (s )=r  -sC ..... (k)).  
After computing it, the Laplace transform fk (s )  can be inverted according to the Euler inverse 
Laplace transform method [15]. We have two cases, according to the value of k with respect 
to M. 
CASE 1. k > M.  e (k ) (s )  = f l (s )O(k - 1)(s) . . . . .  f l ( s )k -M+l~(M -- 1)(S), where f l(s) is the 
Laplace-Stielt jes transform of the busy period BP.  As a classical result, we have 
A + Mp + s -  x / ( f f  + M~ + s) 2 4AMp 
f(s) = 2x  
Now, we only need to know how to compute ~(M - 1)(s), which will be done in Case 2. 
CASE 2. k < M. Then, ~(0)(s)  = 1 and 
(~(k) q~(k + 1)(s) + O---~2(k - 1)(s) 
9 (k) (s)  - e (k )  + s 
- ~ {(k + 1)(s) + k~ r - 1) (s). 
e(k )  + s e (k )  + 
Now, on tile border, we have the following: 
A (M - 1)p sq,(  M _ 2) (s )  
r  - 1)(s)  = e (M - 1) + s @(M)(s) + I~(~I 1) + 
9 (M) (s )  = f (~)e(M - 1 ) (4 ,  
Aft(s) { (M - 1)(s) + (M - 1)# qS(M - 2) (s) ,  
{ (M - 1)(s) = O(M - 1) + s O(M - 1) + s 
1 (M-  1)p rb (M-2) (s ) ,  
==~ r  - 1)(s) = 1 - xZ(~) " @(M - 1) + S - - ' - -  
O(M-1)+s 
(M-  1)# ~(M-  2) (s).  
==~ q(M - 1)(s) = 13(M-  1) + s - Aft(s) 
We want to have a relation linking the values of ~P(k)(s) either with respect o ~(.)(s)  of greater 
values than k, or of smaller values, not both at the same time. F ix  s and denote by ~k = 
62(k)(s), by a(k)  := A/ (@(k)+ s) and by 5(k) := kl_t / (O(k)+ s). Then, we can rewrite the 
recurrence of case k < M as follows ~k = a(k ) .  ~k+l + 5(k) 9 ~k-1 with the fact that  a (M-2)  = 
(@(M - 1) + s - A f l ( s ) ) / ( (M - 1)#) and 6(M - 2) : 0. Because all ~k are positive, but not zero 
(because they are the result of an integral from a strictly positive function), we can also define 
7(k + 1) = Ck+l/(bk. Then, we can rewrite the last equation as follows, 
~(k) 1 1 
ek  = 1 - ~(k ) -~(k  + 1) fk -~ = ~(k) .  Ck-1 = r  1-I ~(J)  = I - [  ~(J)' 
j=k j=k 
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and for each 3' we have the recurrence relation below to compute each of the r = ~(k)(s) ,  for 
any s _> 0. Thus, we completely solved the case k < M. 
5(k) (M - 1)# 
7(k) = 1 - a (k ) .  7(k + 1)' with 7 (M-  1) = I~(M - 1) + s --. Aft(s)" 
EXPECTED TOTAL REWARD CRITERION. The expected cost of a policy 7r, start ing from initial 
state s 0 E Z N is v~(s) ~ 7"-t = = E l  [~t=0 rt(xt, at) + rT(XT)], where the expected value at decision 
epocht  is r t (xt ,at)  = ~--~.xt+,rt(xt,at,xt+l) xpt (x t ,a t ,  xt+l). 
3. OPTIMAL ITY  OF  THE MONOTONE 
NONDECREASING POL IC IES  
The goal of this section is to prove that there exists a nondecreasing monotonic optimal control 
policy, even under very general conditions, satisfied by a broad class of NPD without precedence 
constraints control problems. This leads to great gains in computat ional  efficiency as one can see 
from the monotone backward induction algorithm [4]. 
This section is organized as follows. First, we give a short review of their results which give 
sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal monotonic strategies. Then, we prove that our 
Markov decision model satisfies all these conditions, thus establishing our fundamental result, the 
opt imal i ty of policies that are monotonic (in the part ial  order on the state space) for the finite 
horizon. 
DEFINITION 2. Let X, Y be posets. A function g : X x Y --+ R is supermodular/superadditive 
with respect to the partial order on X,Y  if it satisfies g(x+,y +) + g(x - ,y -  i > g(x+,y - )  + 
g(x- ,  y+), for any x + >x x -  in X ,  and y+ >_y y-  in Y [4]. 
DEFINITION 3. A set K~ = {x E X(t )  I x > s} E X(t )  is an elementary increasing subset. 
COROLLARY 4. All the increasing subsets of X(t ) ,  t E 1,. . .  T are of the form Uq=l Ks,, where 
s, . . . .  • ~ {Nu {-1}} N. 
PROOF. Obvious due its construction I(s~ ...... , = {x E X(t )  3 i  E {1 , . . . ,  k} s.t. x > s,}. 
PROPOSITION 5. With respect to the partial order on X(t )  C zN,  for the MDP constructed 
in the previous section, we have that rt(., ") is supermodular in (xt, at) e X(t )  x A~(xt), t e 
{0, 1 . . . .  T - 1}; r,(., at) : X(T)  --+ Z+ is nondecreasing, t e {0, 1 , . . .  T - 1}; and r r ( )  : X(T)  
Z+ is nondecreasing, for any K increasing subset ofX( t  + 1), t E {0, 1 , . . .  T - 1}. 
PROOF. All properties hold obviously due to the definition of the rewards, and of the reward 
criterion used. Thus, r t (x~,at ,x t+ l )  d__ef 0, for each (xe,at)  C X(t )  x At(xt) ,  xt+l  E X(t  + 1), 
t E {0, 1 , . . .  T -  1}, and rr(') is by definition a nondecreasing function with respect o the partial 
order on Z N. 
PROPOSITION 6. For the action space of the MDP constructed in the previous section, we have 
that At(xt)  = At(xt)  = At(t), for any x, $~ c X( t )  C zN+, t C {0, 1 , . . .  T - 1} O.e., as the state of 
the system increases the number of decisions available to the decision-maker during one review 
period does not decrease). 
PROOF. By definition At(xe) is a sublattice of Z+ N, having as minimal element 0 E Z+ N, and 
as maximal element amax,t. If X _< R C X(t )  means that from both x, :~, we can arrive in the 
rewarded region: R in T - t stages. Since the solving times of the design tasks are considered 
independent random variables, and each of them is a sum of i.i.d. Exp (p) distr ibuted random 
X-~l(n't)+at(n) Sn from inequal- variables (i.e., the solving times of the activities), the ~n=l  ..... N L-,l=l(n,t)+l 
~Z(~,t)+~(~) A(n), with mean k/#.  Thus, (2) is ity (2) is distr ibuted Brlang-k := ~,=i  ..... N Z=Z(~,t)+l 
equivalent to 
t) M] j [# (T ~.! e_ , (T_0M > 1 --/3, 
j=0 
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for any chosen action at(n). This implies a constant number of possible activities to be done 
in (7" - t) review periods. Since we assumed that for any particular design task the number of 
activities needed to solve each of its levels is the constant, the number of possible levels to be 
achieved in (T - t) review periods is constant as well. The number of possible levels of the set of 
actions which decides that the engineers hould perform more than the minimal requirement 0 is 
constant. 
PROPOSITION 7. For the previously constructed MDP, ~x~+IEK pt(xt, at, xt+l) is a nondecreas- 
ing function in xt C X(t), for any K increasing subset of X(t  + 1), t E {0, 1,. . .  T -- 1}. 
PROOF. From Proposition 1 the points in X(t  + 1) s.t. pt(xt ,at ,xt+x) ~ 0 belong to the set 
R .. . . .  +x, {x c Z+ N Ix (0_<x<at+xt}  
Consider x <_ K such that x,K E X(t).  The proposition holds by proving that for each point 
in the Rx,a~+x, we have a unique point of equal probability in the R~,a,+~. Since the terms of 
nonzero probability in ~• e x (t+l) Pt (x, at, xt+ 1) are the ones belonging to R• m +x, we conclude 
the proof. For N : 2, we can draw an easy graphical description of the sets involved in the proof. 
Let z E Rx,aL+x. Then, z = x + Yt, where 0 _< Yt -< at. Now, consider the uniquely determined 
= x + Yt, which clearly belongs to R~,~,+~. Now, we claim that the Pt(X, at, {) = pt(x, at, z). 
Since x < z < x + at, and K < { < K + at from Proposition 1, we have the desired equality. 
PROPOSITION 8. For the previously constructed !ViDP Y~x~+l 6 K Pt (xt, at, xt+a) is a supermodular 
function in (xt,at) E X ( t ) x At(xt), for any K increasingsubset, t C {0, 1 , . . .T  - 1}. 
PRO0 F. From Proposition 1, the points in X (t + 1) s.t. Pt (xt, at, xt+ l) # 0 belong to Rx,,m +x, d~f 
{x 6 Z+ N [ xt < x < at + xt}. Consider x < ~, such that x ,~ C X(t), a _< ~ E At(x) = At(Yr 
(see Proposition 6). We have to prove 
pt(bc, a, x t+, ) -  ~ pt(Y(,a, xt+l)_> ~ pt(x,g~,xt+,)-  ~ pt(x,a,  x t+ l ) - (3 )  
XL+I6K x~+I6K x t+16K x t+16K 
First, we  make a genera l  observat ion  on  the  s t ruc ture  of  the  probab i l i ty  sums invo lved  in inequa l -  
ity (3), 
pt(x,a, xt+l) - Z Pt(x'a'xt+l)= ~ pt(x,&,Xt+l) -- ~ pt (x ,a ,x~+l ) ,  
x l + 16 K xt+ 16 K x_<xt +I <x+a x--<xt + 1 <_x+a 
xt+16K xt+16K 
which has a graphical interpretation i  any dimension. According to Proposition 1, we have for 
a fixed p and A(t) that pt(x,, at,xt+l)  = Pt(x,+l -x t ) .  
Then, inequality (3) can be rewritten as 
Pt (x ,x ,+ l )  -- ~ Pt(x,  xt+l)  
xt + I 6 R~c,~c+aOK x( t + l )6 Rx.x+a(hK 
_> ~ P,(:~, xt+ 1) ~ P,(x, xt+l). 
xl+ 16R~,~+aNK xt+16Rx,x+~.Ng 
This equals further 
0 <_ ~ [Pt(Xt+l - x) - Pt(x,+, - Y~)] + ~ Pt(x,+l - :r 
x,.+ I C R~, i+~NK xt+i 6 R~,~+a\R~,~+~nK 
+ ~ [P,(X,+l - x) - Pt(xt+i - x)] - ~ P,(Xt+l - x). 
xt + 16 R•  ,x+aClK  xt ~- 1E Rx  x+~.\ R•  ,x+a 
Since for each point of the intersection KeR~,,~+~\R~,~+~, we have a point of equal probability 
in the intersection K ~ Rx,x+&\R~,x+a and since 
[P, (Xt+l - ~) - P, (xt+~ - R)] = - ~ [P, (x,+, - x) - Pt (xt+l - x)], 
x~ + ~ ~/~,~+~ x~ + 1 r ~x ,x+a 
the above inequality holds. 
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THEOREM 9. For the MDP constructed in the previous ection, there exist optimal decision rules 
which are nondecreasing in the state of the system. 
PROOF. The conditions of Theorem 3.9.2 from [8] are fulfilled if we remark that if the distribution 
function Ft(w) on ~q is discrete, the expected value of the real-vMued function h(w) on R e, 
f h(w)dFt(w) ,  becomes ~h(w)P{Xt  = w}. By taking T = {1,2}, Ft(w) is stochastically 
increasing in t on T is equivalent with F2(w) is stochastically larger than Fl(w). 
In the case of lattices in Z+ N, we can also use as in [4] the terminology superadditive instead 
of supermodular, increasing instead of isotone, while considering maximization problems. For 
completeness purposes, we give the Theorem 3.9.2 hypothesis: a discrete-time nonstationary 
Markov decision process with finite-horizon T, and finite-space and action space such that for 
any t E {0, 1 . . . .  T - 1}, we have the following. 
1. For any t E {0 ,1 , . . .T -  1}, St := {(xt,at)[(xt ,at)  E X( t )  x At(x~)} is a sublattice of the 
vector lattice I~ q+~. 
2. At(xt) C At('kt) for any t E {0 ,1 , . . .T  - 1} and all states xt <_~,, ~t E X( t )  C I~% 
3. Pt(,  at), PT(') : X ( t )  ---+ R are nondecreasing in xt, for any (xt, at) E X(t )  x At(xt).  
4. the distribution function for the state w in the period t + 1 given the state x and the 
action a, F~,~,t(w), is stochastically increasing in t, for any (xt, at) E X( t )  x At(xt) ,  and 
is stochastically supermodular in (x~, at) E St, for any t c {0, 1, . . .  T - 1}. 
4. ROBUST OPT IMAL  NONDECREASING POL IC IES  
Intuitively one might expect that the monotonicity of the decision rules would imply a stable 
structure of the optimal paths (i.e., an increase in an exogenous parameter 0 will lead to a uniform 
increase of the optimal path). While this statement is true in the unidimensional stationary 
case (see [16] for a proof), [17] give a two-dimensional example of a chaotic optimal path for a 
monotonic decision rule, as well as an analysis of connections between monotonic policies and 
the optimal path when At(xt)  are sublattices of I1~ m for any xt E X(t) .  As a consequence of 
Corollary 1 [171, we have a robustness result for the nondecreasing monotonic optimal policies of 
the discrete-time nonstationary Markov decision processes which can be formulated below. 
COROLLARY 10. Let Y be a lattice, 0 C R m a sublattice, and X a partially ordered set with 
Y• C_ X for any (x, 0) E X • E). I f  we have the following, for each (x, 0) E X • (9, there 
exists maxyEz g(x,O,y); Yx,O is increasing in (x,O) E X x Eg; g(-,x,8) : Y --~ • is supermodular 
in y E Y for each (x, 0) E X x O, and has increasing differences in (y ;x ,0)  E Y x (X x O) 
then for any x + >_x x -  E X ,  O- <_ 0 + E O, we have that maxargmaxyEvg(x - ,O- ,y )  _< 
max arg maxyE y g(x + , ~+, y). 
Now, we will study how the optimal paths and optimal values are changing with respect 
to the important parameters of our NPD model without precedence constraints. We prove tile 
robustness with respect o the variation of the solving rate of the design activities and of the safety 
margin for achieving the new product at the deadline in the case of nondecreasing monotonic 
optimal policies. 
COROLLARY 11. For the Markov decision process constructed in Section 2, a decrease in the 
parameter/3 (i.e., an increase in 1/3) leads to a uniform increase in the optimal decisions along 
any optimal sample path, where in every period the largest action is always chosen. 
PROOF. Let wt(xt, )3, at) := rt (xt,/3, at) + ~--~-x~+,ex(t+l) pt(xt, 13, a~, xt+l) - u* (xt+1) as given in 
a backward induction algorithm, and we verify one by one each hypothesis of Corollary 10. 
(1) max~EA(• ,/3, at) exists for any (xt,/3) E Xt x (0, 1) since the action space and state 
space are finite (i.e., we may apply a backward induction algorithm). 
(fi) Let 1/j3 _< 1//3 then/3 >_ ~ E (0, 1) and with a smaller probability the team of engineers 
can perform more activities during the same review period. So, for any xt _< xt E X(t): 
At(xt,  1//3) C At(xt, 1/3) = mt(:~t, 1/~). 
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(3) Following the same reasoning as in Theorem 3.9.2 from [8], we can prove the superad- 
ditivity of wt(xt,/3, at) by using that u* (xt, fl) is nondecreasing, and that the function 
~x~+~e:<(t+l) pt(xt,/3, at, xt+l) is nondecreasing on (xt, fl) E X(t) x O, and superadditive 
on (xt,/3, at) E X(t) x @ x At(xt,/3). 
From Proposition 1 the nonstationary transition probabilities pt(xt, at,xt+l)  do not depend 
on ft. Thus, the previous requirements hold true due to [8, Lemma 3.9.4] and Proposition 8. 
Now, for any j E X(t  + 1), we denote by 
zj := [pt(xt,fl, at,j) + pt(xt,/3, at,j)], 
5 j :=  [Pt(Xt,/3, St, j) + Pt (xt, 3, at, j)], 
and 
Vj := Ut+l(j), 
in order to apply for them from [8, Theorem 3.9.1]. (Let T a subset of ~mand {Ft(w) : t E T} a 
collection of distribution functions on ~R q. Ft (w) is stochastically increasing in t on T if and only 
if f h(w)dFt(w) is increasing in t on T for each increasing real-valued function h(w) on Rq.) Its 
hypotheses are fulfilled since X(t  + 1) C_ R q, the function ~--~-x,+~eK pt(xt,/3, at,xt+l)  is nonde- 
creasing on (xt,/3) E X(t) x O and u*(xt,/3) is nondecreasing. Also, if the distribution function 
Ft(w ) on ~q is discrete, the expected value of the real-valued function h(w) on ~q,f  h(w)dFt(w), 
becomes ~ h(w)P(Xt  = w}. By taking T = {1, 2}, Ft(w) is stochastically increasing in t oil T 
is equivalent with F2(w) is stochastically larger than F1 (w). Thus, 
9 , . f l ,  a t ,3 ) ]Ut+l (2 ) ,  > y .[pdx.Z,a ,j) - " * 
jEK jEK 
which implies that ~xt+~EKPt(Xt,/3, at, Xt+l)U~+l(Xt+l ) is a superadditive function in 
(xt,/3, a,) E X(t) x o x &(x . /3 ) ,  
for any K increasing subset of X(t  + 1), t E {0, 1 , . . .T  - 1}. 
Since the sum of superadditive functions defined on the same domain remains superadditive, 
wt(xt,/3, at) is superadditive in (xt,/3, at) E X(t) x 0 x At(xt,/3). 
COROLLARY 12. For the Markov decision process constructed in Section 2, an increase in the 
parameter # leads to a uniform increase in the optimal decisions along any optimal sample path, 
where in every period the largest action is always chosen. 
PROOF. O := {# > 0 I A(t)/# < M} is a lattice and similar to the proof of Proposition 8 we 
have that wt(xt, #, at) is superadditive in (xt, #, at) E X(t) x (3 x At(x,, #). Thus, we can apply 
Corollary 10 as above to obtain the robustness result for the parameter #. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we prove the existence of a nondecreasing monotonic optimal policy for a non- 
stationary Markov decision process which models the time-quality trade-offs taking place during 
the evolution of an NPD situation without precedence constraints. This result leads to computa- 
tional advantages from considering only nondecreasing control actions. This in turn restricts the 
backward induction algorithm to look for candidate actions for the argmax for a given state x 
only in the superior cones of the elements of the arg max of all states x' which are smaller than x. 
Moreover, these policies allow us to study the way in which the optimal paths and optimal values 
change with respect o the important parameters of our concurrent NPD model. We have proved 
in the case of nondecreasing monotonic optimal policies the robustness with respect o the vari- 
ation of the key parameters: the solving rate of the design activities and, respectively, the safety 
margin for achieving the new product at the deadline. 
238 A.B.  DRAGUT 
REFERENCES 
1. V. Krishnan and K.T. Ulrich, Product development decisions: A review of tile literature, Management Science 
47, 1-21, (2001). 
2. S. Bhattacharya, V. Krishnan and V. Mahjan, Managing new product definition in highly dynamic environ- 
ments, Management Science 44, 50-64, (1998). 
3. S.P. Heyman and M.J. Sobel, Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Volume 2, IVlcGraw-Hill, New York, 
(1984). 
4. M. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, John Wiley and Sons, 
(1994). 
5. M. Yoshimura, Design optimisation for product life cycle, In Design for X, (Edited by G.Q. Huang), pp. 
424-440, Chapman and Hall, London, (1996). 
6. A. Huchzermeier and C.H. Loch, Project management under isk: Using the real options approach to evaluate 
flexibility in R&D, Management Science 47, 85-101, (2001). 
7. G. Moscarini and L. Smith, The optimal evel of experimentation, Econometrica 11, 1629-1644, (2001). 
8. D.M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Frontiers of Economic Research series, Princeton Uni- 
versity Press, (1998). 
9. H. Hopenhayn and E. Prescott, Stochastic monotonicity and stationary distributions for dynamic economies, 
Econometrica 60, 1307-1406, (1992). 
10. A. Garcia and R.L. Smith, Solving nonstationary infinite horizon stochastic production planning problems, 
Operations Research Letters 27 (3), 135-141, (2000). 
l l. R. Wichers, A Theory of Individual Behavior, Academic Press, London, (1996). 
12. E. Aslasken and R. Belcher, Systems Engineering, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N J, (1992). 
13. K.E. van Oorschot, Analysing Radical NPD Projects from an Operational Control Perspective, Eindhoven 
University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands, (2001). 
14. S.K. Reed, Cognztion, Theory and Applications, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, CA, (1988). 
15. J. Abate and W. Whitt, Numerical inversion of Laplace transforms ofprobability distributions, ORSA Journal 
on Computing 7, 36-43, (1995). 
16. R. Denekere and S. Pelikan, Competitive chaos, Journal of Economical Theory 40, 13-25, (1986). 
17. E J. Friedman and S. Johnson, Dynamic monotonicity and comparative statics for real options, Journal of 
Economic Theory 75 (1), 104-121, (1997). 
